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1. Introduction  
 
Local governments are no passive players in the European integration process. Far from it, faced with 
a considerable amount of EU legislation local authorities are increasingly recognizing the importance 
of a good understanding on EU matters and its impact on the local level. As most environmental 
problems faced today cross national borders, an increasing number of local governments have 
recognized the need to engage with their fellow counterparts in other member states by means of 
Transnational Municipal Networks. These networks are hailed in contemporary EU Studies literature 
as being a prime example of an increasing emancipation of municipalities in an ongoing process of 
Europeanization of the local realm. However, looking at the list of members and signatories of 
networks such as Eurocities reveals that they consist, mostly, of a member state’s large cities. While 
there are exceptions, it has often been shown that larger cities with an active international coordination 
office and high financial capacity are eager participants in international networks. There is little 
evidence that suggests that the majority of a country’s municipalities has the capacity, nor the 
willingness to draw on international best practice. Due to much focus on the transnational character of 
municipal Europeanisation in the form of networks, to little attention has been paid to the fact that 
most local authorities, when it comes to practical and innovative approaches to policy implementation, 
might be far better served by networks on the national level and specifically their respective Local 
Government Associations which have been serving as central knowledge hubs and have been acting as 
proponents of local government’s interests vis-à-vis higher government levels for far longer than any 
of the international networks. Such associations have considerable membership base, consisting off all 
municipalities in their respective countries, they can draw on extensive input, not only from local 
officials, but from a range of domestic policy actors and competence agencies. They are well situated 
in the political context of a particular member state and can cater EU-related information to local 
governments from a domestic perspective and in the national language.   
 
Taking a comparative case study approach, this inter-disciplinary thesis will attempt to contribute to 
the literature on the Europeanisation of local government by calling for an increased focus on the 
underlying domestic policy-making structures in which Local Government Associations operate in 
order to support local governments with implementation of EU environmental sustainability policy by 
means of mutual learning and capacity development. For this purpose, a comparison between two EU 
member states with a different internal political system, but in which Local Government Associations 
play an important role is highly relevant. By analysing differences in domestic policy-making 
structures it is possible to demonstrate how they facilitate mobilisation and effective implementation 
of environmental sustainability policies on the local level. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
The following literature review will demonstrate two main currents in the literature: First, an 
increasing focus on the fact that cities are increasingly perceived as crucial actors in the process of 
European governance. Second, scholarly engagement to portray cities as pro-active players in the EU 
by means of transnational cooperation will be laid out. The literature review will demonstrate that 
there is a need for “looking back” at the domestic context to fully understand how Europe’s cities are 
reacting to Europe.  
 
2.1 Increasing localism in EU policy-making   
 
Even though the EU level or national level has the capability to set the general frameworks for EU-
wide policy implementation, many authors agree that local municipalities can have a more direct 
impact on local projects and hence can quickly conduct local policies (Sippel 2009, Monni 2008, Kern 
2009, Kousky 2011, Toly 2008). There appears to be a common understanding that while overall 
responsibility remains at the national level, key responsibility for implementing the EU directives and 
national policy lies with the lower levels of government. While research is still too often focused on 
international regime formation and the policy positions of national governments, “it is at the 
prefectural, provincial, or state levels, in large municipalities as well as at the county, town and village 
levels that many policy ideas are first generated and where some of the most creative solutions are 
being tried out (Scheurs 2008, 346). In this regard, authors frequently give examples of local 
governments moving faster and influencing central and national governmental decisions.  
This can be explained by stating that in many European countries authority is increasingly being 
transferred from the national to the sub-national level as “government has been increasingly 
decentralized and local competencies expanded” (Kern 2009, 311). As a result, “boundaries between 
different arenas have been blurred to the point of insignificance because many policy actors are able to 
become active at the different levels and pursue multi-level strategies” (Kern 2009, 312). Because 
municipal policy making is closest to the people “they may thus be best suited to mobilize people to 
adapt to economic and societal transformation needed to achieve large emission reduction, and for 
inclusive adaptation policies” (Dodman 2003). Kousky and Schneider also argue that because local 
governments are closer to their constituency they can present direct results clearly and have the 
possibility to reach out to citizens directly e.g. by means of education efforts (Kousky and Schneider 
2011, 370). This can result in an increase in awareness, which can not only motivate individual action, 
it also has the potential to influence state and national policy makers especially if citizens become 
“more active and aware of climate policy” (Kousky and Schneider 2011, 370).  
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Taking EU level climate governance as an example Monni considers it as an additional level of 
governance between the international and the national level. Hence, climate policy in the EU observes 
the principle of subsidiarity which entails that the higher administration levels are expected to only 
deal with issues which could not be dealt with efficiently at the lower levels (Monni 2008, 744). Since 
all local governments in the EU are considered to have some competence in the field of energy and 
transport policy, action as close to the citizens as possible could be considered the most appropriate 
(Collier 1997, 39). However, the degree as to which municipalities take initiative in the form a local 
climate change mitigation policy differs between the different member states. In the case of energy 
policy cities which have direct ownership of local energy companies are capable of directly 
influencing investments and pricing and consequently have an impact on municipal emissions (Collier 
1997, 43). This is supported by the fact that local governments have an important role as planning 
authorities and have the final say in the sitting of renewable energy facilities.  
Scholarly literature, while acknowledging the increased relevance of the “local factor” in EU policy 
making, also points to the troubles involved. Despite the positive view of why European 
municipalities should actively get involved in local climate policy, some scholars point out that local 
governments face considerable restrains (Collier 1997, Hakelberg 2014, Kern 2009, Kousky 2011, 
Peeters 2012). Despite the motivation of many cities to implement more efficient local policy, cities 
are often seriously underfinanced since in most cases climate policy is not a required task of city 
administrations is therefore at times considered a luxury rather than an essential policy aspect 
(Hakelberg 2014, 108). The capacity of local governments to develop and to finance local climate 
polices and the transition to become low-carbon communities could be severely hindered. For this 
reason, Peeters proposes that funds should come predominantly from the communities themselves and 
there should be requirements for citizens and the private sector to increase energy-insulation in 
buildings. It is very important to consider that local climate change mitigation action by one 
municipality is only relevant if other municipalities follow suite particularly in the emission sector in 
order to prevent a “waterbed effect” if adequate coordination measures are not taking place. Therefore, 
it is up to EU law makers to construct a structure that incentivizes municipalities to harmonically 
transform into low-carbon communities (Peeters 2012, 298). Collier explains that because of too little 
allocation of competences from EU and national levels to the local area municipalities have a rather 
small scope of action with regard to energy policy or public transport provisions. Although there 
might be high local commitment, by citizens and the city council alike, often “nationally imposed 
budget constrains or low energy prices can frustrate the best intentions” (Collins 1997, 55). Therefore, 
there appears to be a clear need for appropriate supporting measures from both the EU and the national 
levels. This includes emphasizing that the “principle of subsidiarity” should entail more than only 
directing power to lower levels, but should rather refer to the coordination between different levels of 
government (ibid).  
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In this respect Conzelmann (2008) points out that “subsidiarity” can be characterized as the 
overarching principle for a new structure of EU policy-making referred to as “new modes of 
governance (NMG)”. This includes soft, and non-binding, forms of regulation and the emergence of 
public-private governance arrangements. This is especially relevant when considering that the 
European Commission increasingly is of the opinion that regional development plans drawn up by 
regional and local actors are more meaningful than those created by member state bureaucracies, in 
addition to their ability to diffuse “new ideas that contrasted from the more traditional focus on 
infrastructure and investments” (Conzelmann 2008, 5). Be this as it may, the constant reference to the 
principle of subsidiarity does neglect the fact that with certain issues that have a cross border impact it 
might be beneficial for competences to remain fixed at the national or EU level as this can guarantee a 
more efficient implementation of policies (Peeters, 295). Since local climate policy-making is a 
voluntary task for municipalities in many countries “local governments` reluctance to implement 
regulatory policies can be explained by the absence of control and compliance measures taken by 
national and international (EU) levels” (Bulkeley and Schroeder 2009, 359).  
 
2.2 Transnational Municipal Networks  
 
Top-down and bottom-up dynamics are not only limited to the EU and its member states but also 
apply to the relationship between EU institutions and local authorities (Kern 2009, 312). In this respect, 
Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs) are a direct result of the multi-level nature of EU 
governance. In addition to traditional state regulation the EU has created a field for shifting 
competences between local, national and supranational governmental institutions (Kern 2009, 311). 
Lidskog differentiates between formal forms of multi-level governance, which is derived from the 
Kyoto Protocol via the EU and national governments down to local governments and an informal one 
that is based on voluntary associations between local governments. The author considers the 
emergence of TMNs to fall between these two structures and being based on “policy proximity” 
(Lidskog 2010, 38). Bulkeley argues that due to the changing nature of governance in Europe from 
being focused on national governments, facilitated by the European Commission, to a more multi-
level system that involves governments at different scales and non-state actors “nations states no 
longer monopolize policy making” (Bulkeley, 2010, 238). Therefore, TMNs have the ability to 
directly involve and represent cities at international and European levels crossing national borders 
(Bulkeley 2010, 236). 
Similarly, focusing on bottom-up governance Cole (2011), and Hakelberg have demonstrated that 
TMNs are platforms, which “have the ability to steer member cities toward the adoption of climate 
strategies (Hakelberg 2014, 110). They do so by relying on “governance by diffusion” to promote the 
adoption of local action plans. By engaging in a sharing of expertise and the identification of best 
practice examples from different municipalities the learning process among member cities is 
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accelerated (Hakelberg, 2014, 115). The author points out that communication, in addition to the 
exchange of knowledge and “best practice” between different member cities is essential because most 
municipalities are lacking in resource to engage in bilateral transnational relations (Hakelberg 2014, 
117). Thus, the author equally considers a polycentric regime complex to accelerate these processes 
through networks between municipalities (Hakelberg 2014, 123).   
Scheurs points to the fact that some local governments might be highly in favour of joining a TMN in 
order to be perceived as a pioneer in the field of local climate change mitigation. Also, whether or not 
a municipality has environment-minded leader is an essential factor. However, Sippel states that even 
if a municipality would increase its local climate action e.g. by investing into controlling its 
greenhouse gas emissions there is a chance that this action would have no significant overall effect if 
emissions are increasing elsewhere (Sippel 2009, 16). Also, local governments might be reluctant to 
make investments, due to the initial cost, especially considering the lack of financial resources 
available to many local governments (Sippel 2009, 20). This is connected to the question of whether 
or not municipalities have adequate access to funds from other sources.  
 
The above literature review has demonstrated two essential issues. First, there appears to be growing 
attention by scholars for an increased focus on the local level of policy making in the EU, especially 
with “green” issues such as climate change and the environment. Second, scholars point to TMNs as 
having the potential to act as a catalyst for the facilitation of knowledge about international 
environmental sustainability issues and as platforms for the exchange of best-practice. Be this as it 
may, even though TMNs have received most of the attention in terms of research output, especially 
among scholars of the EU, such an approach does disregard the very core of multi-level governance: 
diversity. While TMNs are in fact networks between local governments, there exist close to no 
significant studies on how local governments are supported in their domestic context and how this 
shapes their interaction with regard to the EU. Of course, networks that cross beyond borders are 
valuable and deserve academic attention, however one does not have to look further than the domestic 
context to find that there is active networking taking place between local authorities within the 
member states themselves. With a history going back much further than all TMNs the national Local 
Government Associations (LGAs) often have membership bases including all the municipalities of a 
particular member state and are well-staffed. Functioning as the central networking hubs for local 
governments in the country they have excellent knowledge about the domestic context and they 
provide valuable services to members ranging from similar actions such as the facilitation of best-
practice exchange, but also operative advice on how to “deal with Europe”. Therefore, based on the 
literature review provided above this thesis will attempt to fill this gap in the literature by answering 
the following research question:  
How do Local Government Associations foster the implementation of environmental sustainability 
policies in the context of EU legislation? 
	 8	
3. Research Design  
 
This thesis aims to apply an interpretative comparative case study method. Comparison is often used 
in political scientific studies and is important for demonstrating similarities and contrasts among cases 
(Collier 1993, 105). Generally speaking, case studies are “used to develop and test empirical 
implication of theoretical formulations” (Andersen 2003, 14). Cases have been chosen due to their 
appropriateness for a controlled comparison because it enables a comparison of “most similar cases 
which, ideally, are cases that are comparable in all respects except for one independent variable, 
whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes (George and Bennett 2004, 81). 
As most work that makes use of case studies can be considered variable-oriented work in which a 
researcher first defines a problem in a way that allows looking at many cases as units of analysis, the 
relevant dependent variable (the phenomenon under study) and the potential independent variables 
(those variables that are expected to explain the phenomenon) will be introduced resulting in a 
situation in which the relations among dependent and independent variables dominate the research 
process (Ragin 1992, 5). The academic opinion regarding the use of a small number of cases (small-n) 
is divided, especially since it is often argued that statistical methods, using a large quantity of cases 
allows for better generalisation. However, Ragin claims that small-n case studies are most valuable if 
little is known about a certain area (citied in Andersen 2003, 14). Given the fact that little research has 
been conducted on the domestic context in which LGAs operate this thesis can indeed be perceived as 
adding to an area about which little is known. A fundamental issue with using this kind of approach is 
that one has to deal with many variables, but only a small number of cases. Still, considering the 
scarcity of time and financial resources of a study such as this thesis faces, comparatively analysing a 
few number of cases “may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many 
cases” (Lijphart 1971, 685). 
 
Comparing the Netherlands to Germany is highly relevant considering that despite their proximity and 
founding membership in the EU, their political system differs significantly. Lijphart states that 
comparability is more inherent within an area than in a randomly selected set of countries. Such an 
approach should not be used in an indiscriminately fashion, but “only where it offers the possibility of 
establishing crucial controls” (Lijphart 1971, 689). In the case of two member states the founding EU-
membership offers that crucial control. It is therefore important to establish key variables in order 
discover controlled relationships through the elimination of variables of marginal importance without 
being overwhelmed by large numbers of variables (Lijphart 1971, 690).  As can be seen below 
independent variables have been derived from both theoretical frameworks. Within the thesis these 
independent variables will be analysed in the form of the following sub-questions:  
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1. How does the political system give shape to local self-governance?  
2. What are the implications of financial dependence on higher government levels? 
3. What support frameworks for local governments are provided?  
4. What kind of attention is there towards the EU among local governments?  
5. How do local governments adapt to European legislation? 
 
In order to enable accurate comparison a set of binary indicators (yes/no) have been established for 
each independent variable. It is assumed that both cases will be most similar in all independent 
variables except for the independent variable on the political system. Addressing these indicators 
within each sub-question leads to claims being made on the dependent variable which is the support of 
local governments by Local Government Associations (bottom-up implementation) within a synthesis.  
 
 
Dependent variableIndicatorsIndependent variablesTheory
Multi-level governance
Political system
High degree of self-
government
Strong position of LGA
Dependence on central 
government
High financial 
dependency 
Bottom-up 
implementation of 
environmental 
sustainability policies
National support
Availability of programs 
directly targeted at local 
governments
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The theoretical concepts of Multi-level governance and Europeanization form the backbone of this 
thesis. In the study of international municipal cooperation these concepts are often used 
interchangeably. However, this thesis applies multi-level governance primarily to the domestic context, 
and uses Europeanization to analyse the implications stemming from the EU on local governments, 
therefore treating both concepts separately is thought to have considerable merit. The variables will be 
applied to both case studies in order to find empirical evidence for both theories. The results will then 
be presented in a synthesis which utilizes insights gained from the empirical corroboration of 
aforementioned theories for claims on the occurrence of bottom-up implementation. Since this concept 
is considered as the dependent variable, its theoretical meaning will also be explained as part of the 
theoretical framework chapter.  
Because the aim of this study is to provide a contextual account of two EU member states, instead of 
focusing on one specific case, the choice has been made to focus only on desk-instead of field research. 
Doing so enabled the researcher to develop an understanding of the processes involved while drawing 
on in-depth empirical studies with regard to local government in both countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Indicators Independent variablesTheory
Europeanization
Adaption of European 
legislation and policy by 
local government
Strong changes of local 
processes
Local actors' attention 
towards EU policies and 
legislation
Availability of 
information services on 
EU
Bottom-up 
implementation of 
environmental 
sustainability policies
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4. Theoretical Framework  
 
4.1 Multi-level governance  
 
The theoretical concept of multi-level governance has received an astounding increase in attention 
over the course of the past two decennia and underscores the perception that traditional centralized 
authority of command and control has little resonance, especially with scholars of European Union 
Studies, and that is is not well suited to accommodate diversity as conditions may vary between 
different regions. Instead modern governance should be “dispersed across multiple centres of authority 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003, 223). Hooghe and Marks have laid out two types of multi-level governance. 
Type I is concerned with sharing power “among a limited number of governments operating at just a 
few levels”, in which “every citizen is located in a Russian Doll set of nested jurisdictions, where there 
is one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale” (2003, 236). Also termed 
the vertical dimension of multi-level governance it recognizes the fact that “national governments 
cannot effectively implement strategies without working closely with regional and local governments 
as agents of change” (Kamal-Chaoui 2009, 27). This does also imply that membership of certain 
jurisdictions (national states, regional, or local governments) does not intersect (2003, 237). Applied to 
the local realm with regard to environmental sustainability this means that local governments cannot 
operate in isolation from other parts of government because local governmental authority in relevant 
areas “is often nested in legal and institutional frameworks at higher scales” (Dietz cited in Kamal-
Chaoui 2009, 9). Actions taken at the local level may either enable or constrain national level policies 
and the other way around. Therefore, a two-way relationship between European, national and local 
action can be made out (Kamal-Chaoui 2009, 9). Type II governance is more concerned with task-
specific, flexible jurisdictions instead of general purpose. In such a governance system citizens are not 
served by “the government, but by a variety of different public service industries” (Hooge and Marks 
2003, 237). Also often termed polycentred governance it concerns the coexistence of many different, 
formally independent decision-making centres and centres around problem-driven jurisdictions such 
as task forces, interregional commissions and intercity agencies (ibid). This type is much more flexible 
than the former due to there being no dominant actor. Instead the governance system consists of “a 
wide range of public and private actors who collaborate and compete in shifting coalitions” (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003, 238). Evidently, Type II communities are voluntary and membership in multiple 
groups is entirely possible (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 240). Taking multi-level governance as a prime 
theoretical concept is important here because it requires stepping away from the local as a frame of 
reference in order to “engage with the processes which shape local capacity and political will for 
sustainable development at multiple sites and scales of governance in order to explain why moves 
towards urban sustainability are, and are not, taking place” (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, 48). As Merlot 
points out this type of governance also concerns “different forms of coordination among local 
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jurisdictions that belong to the same urban metropolitan area, or the same rural area, or between urban 
and rural areas” (Merlot, 27). Ostrom points to the advantages of a polycentric system in which 
governmental units from different levels “both compete, interact and learn from another” (Ostrom 
2010). This is fundamentally different from a “monocentric hierarchy” where decision-making power 
rests only with the higher levels and where the lower levels abide by these commands (Cole 2011, 10). 
According to Ostrom, parties are encouraged to engage in polycentric networks because it is possible 
to use local knowledge and to learn from other members who “are also engaged in a trial-and-error 
learning process”. Therefore, polycentric systems have the capability to strengthen the levels of 
cooperation of participants, enhance innovation, learning, adaption and trustworthiness (Ostrom 2010, 
552). Still, Ostrom also explains that governance based on a polycentric system does not necessary 
imply a more efficient policy making. Especially in the case of climate policy actors in a multi-level 
polycentric system are keen to “free ride on the efforts of others and not contribute at all or not 
contribute an appropriate share” (2010, 555).  
Consequently, this thesis assumes both Type I and Type II multi-level governance to provide adequate 
theoretical backing for analysing the role of LGAs as they can act as intermediaries between the local 
governments, non-state actors, central government and the European Union.   
 
4.2 Europeanisation   
 
The concept of Europeanization “redefines relationships between different state institutions and levels 
of government” (Schultze 2010, 122). The creation of the EU has resulted in a surge of collaboration 
and cooperation in which sub-national actors are finding new strategic challenges and opportunities to 
employ in a “diffuse and polyarchic political environment” (ibid). This implies that the EU should not 
merely be considered as a new level of government, but as a political system which has urged the 
creation innovative approaches to governance (Kohler Koch cited in Laffan 1997, 7). The degree of 
“openness to Europeanisation and adaptation to growing internationalization varies from member state 
to member state and within states among different social groups and institutions” (Rometch and 
Wessels cited in Laffan 1997, 7).  
This is striking because it implies that central and federal governments are not the enforcers of many 
EU directives. An astonishing amount of EU legislation directly affects local laws (John 2000, 64).  
Therefore, “change occurs when political behaviour at the EU level has a transformative effect on 
domestic political behaviour” (Radaelli 2012, 1). However, especially in the case of environmental 
legislation domestic policy makers, administrators and business actors often resist its implementation. 
Domestic actors can “pull down” EU policy to the domestic level by putting pressure on public 
administration “to legally incorporate, practically apply and enforce it” (Boerzel and Buzogany 2010, 
712).   
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Generally, there categorizations of Europeanization can be made out: top-down, bottom-up and 
horizontal Europeanization. The first refers to the impact of the EU`s legal and financial framework on 
local authorities, whereas the second refers to local authorities influencing EU decision-making 
directly at the European level not solely by lobbying at the national level via their national 
associations, but also directly at the European level. (Kern 2009, Dyson and Goetz 2003). Horizontal 
Europeanization concerns “the cooperation and mutual exchange of best practice and innovations 
through transnational networks and partnerships (Guderjan 2013, 44). Schultze applies this concept by 
pointing to a change in city’s position in the policy making field by no longer falling in the “policy-
taker” category simply implementing EU directives via their national governments. Instead, local 
authorities are considered as pro-active players in a polyarchic system of participatory governance 
(Schultze 2003, 126). Effectively, cities do not solely approach Brussels for financial benefits. By 
receiving influence over programming and policy development cities are being recognized as 
“stakeholder and actor in ongoing EU integration and European policy development” (Schultze 2003, 
128). Europeanisation has thus “unlocked” cities from hierarchical constrains of their national systems 
“by allowing them to build transnational coalitions, which suggest a careful re-labelling of cities as 
policy makers” (Schultze 2003, 137). In order to provide a classification of a city’s EU related activity 
John has provided a “Europeanization ladder”. Dividing the steps of the ladder into stages of 
Europeanization John makes a differentiation between four stages. In the minimal stage, local 
governments care little about EU affairs and are simply implementing EU directives and regulations 
while managing European information. In the next stage, local governments are increasingly aware of 
the financial opportunities offered by EU grants. Municipalities which are actively participating in 
international networks and are cooperating in joint projects have entered what John refers to as the 
networking stage. Finally, local governments that have passed through all of these stages are 
considered to be fully Europeanized actively advising and lobbying the EU on implementation and 
policy issues (John 1994). 
Looking at the available literature on Europeanization of local government, it is striking how much 
attention has been paid on the actions of a select few large cities driving the Europeanization of local 
government and the impact this can have on European integration as a whole. However, even though 
numerous scholars repeating the merits of horizontal Europeanization does certainly contribute to 
“spreading the word”, it does not pay adequate attention to the fact that a great majority of local 
governments in the EU are not even close to “moving up the ladder” and engaging in international 
best-practice exchange. Instead, this thesis attempts to paint a realistic picture by arguing that most 
local governments are still primarily receivers and implementers of European legislation without being 
overly concerned about European affairs. Therefore, this thesis shall consider the concept of 
Europeanization primarily with regard to its top-down nature.   
 
	 14	
4.3 Bottom-up Implementation  
 
Generally speaking, policy implementation can be defined as “the process of carrying out a 
government decision (Berman cited in De Groff 2009, 49), in addition to being perceived as “an 
iterative process in which ideas, expressed as policy, are transformed into behaviour” (Ottson and 
Green cited in De Groff 2009, 49). The definition of the term does derive from the academic field of 
“implementation analysis” which is “the study of the conditions under which authoritative decisions 
do lead to desired outcomes” (ibid). Regarding environmental sustainability this will entail “the 
deployment of all strategies that avoid, remedy or mitigate environmental impacts, policies, incentives, 
programs and regulations used by local governments to protect, preserve and sustain the natural 
environment (Laurian 2016, 2).  
There appear to be two main perspectives regarding the question about what makes an implementation 
effective. First of all, taking a top-down view on the implementation process entails judging 
implementation success based on “a comparison between the intended and actually achieved outcome” 
(Knill 2007, 152). If there is a match between the set objectives and the produced outcome effective 
implementation should have been achieved. This is a rather straightforward way of describing 
implementation since it assumes that preferences applied by governments and legislators are 
homogenous with “clear and unambiguous standards and guidelines for administrative authorities 
responsible for implementation and enforcement” (ibid). Therefore, the top-down view can also be 
considered to fall within a rational management perspective in which implementation is seen as a 
product resulting from strong bureaucratic management involving, coercion, control and compliance 
for the purpose of ensuring adherence with the policy objectives (Mazmanian & Sabatier cited in 
Paudel 2009). In this light central authorities are seen as statue framers serving as key actors, whereas 
local actors are perceived as as impediments to successful implementation “whose shirking behaviour 
needs to be controlled” (Matland 1995, 148).  
However, with regard to how LGAs support municipalities this thesis considers the following 
definition to be more appropriate: The bottom-up view on effective implementation does not simply 
define policy objectives as benchmarks that have to be reached. Instead, the policy implementation 
process may undergo modifications (Knill 2007, 153). Policy implementers (e.g. local service 
deliverers) have autonomy and flexibility in adjusting the policy given particular local requirements, 
in addition to fluctuations in the perception of policy problems (ibid). In practical terms this means 
that centrally located actors devise government programs at the macroimplementational level, whereas 
it is local organizations (e.g. municipalities) who react to these plans at the microimplementational 
level by developing and implementing their own programs. In this respect, street-level bureaucrats are 
central in the political process as they have a better understanding of what the locality needs because 
they are in direct contact with the public (Paudel 2009, 41). It is argued that if local actors do not get 
the chance to adapt a policy to local conditions it is likely to fail (Matland 1995, 148). National and 
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European programs are often poorly adapted to local conditions (Hull and Hjern cited in Pandel 2009, 
42). Often “program success depends in large part on the skills of individuals in the local 
implementation structure, who can adapt the policy to local conditions” (ibid). Because of this there is 
also considerable variation in how the same national (or European) policy is implemented at the local 
level (Berman cited in Knill 2007, 148).  Hence, “effective implementation is not measured by the 
attainment of certain centrally-defined objectives, but judged by the extent to which the perceived 
outcomes correspond with the preferences of the actors involved in the implementation process” (ibid). 
Evaluation whether a policy has been implemented successfully is particularly based around the 
question whether this policy has allowed for “processes of learning, capacity-building and support-
building in order to address policy problems in a decentralized way consistent with the interests of the 
actors involved” (Ingram and Schneider citied in Knill 2007, 153). In fact, the bottom-up perspective 
emphasises not only the interests of different stakeholders, but also rejects the idea of clear cut 
hierarchies and clear delineations of competences between the administrative and political actors from 
different institutional levels (ibid). This means that the implementation process is based on constant 
bargaining which “implies complex interactions between public and private actors and organizations 
at the national, regional and local level with potentially diverging interests, beliefs and perceptions 
with regard to the underlying policy problem” (ibid). Consequently, successful implementation can 
only occur when all affected parties are involved early in the policy-making process covering issue 
definition, policy formulation and including the actual implementation stage (Berman cited in de Groff 
2009, 49). Be this as it may, even with a such a bottom-up perspective the factor of local autonomy 
should not be overemphasized. Even though there might be local level differences, if clear borders are 
defined by centrally determined policy local actions can be limited. The general institutional structure 
and available resources, in addition to access to an implementing arena are all factors that can be 
centrally determined and thus affect policy outcomes (Matland 1995, 150).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 16	
5. EU Policies Vis-à-vis Local Government 
  
From a neofunctionalist point of view EU policies continue to evolve due to pressure from EU 
institutions and European environmental organisations generating a spillover effect (Goedings 2010, 
17). Even thought there is no clear “sustainability policy” originating in Brussels, with its EU 
Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), the EU has committed itself to applying principles of 
sustainable development as guiding principles for its other policies. The strategy has been divided into 
a thematic framework covering ten areas incorporating the economic, the social, the environmental, 
the global and the institutional dimensions (Eurostat 2016). Because the strategy has been designed to 
serve as a guideline for other EU policies it exists as a constant point of reference in terms of guidance 
and also monitoring.  
In accordance with Article 11 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), also 
referred to as the “integration principle”, the EU has integrated the guidelines from its 2001 
Sustainable Development Strategy into its Europe 2020 Agenda. Effectively, by combining 
sustainability principles from the EU SDS with “good governance” principles in the Europe 2020 
Strategy a multi-level governance system is being described and its necessity therefore acknowledged 
by the EU. The strategy calls for an optimal channelling of sustainable development by the member 
states and the Commission. The complementarities and synergies between “various strands of 
Community and other co-financing mechanisms such as cohesion policy, rural development, Life+ 
(Council of the European Union 2004, 24) is of utmost importance, especially considering EU-level 
funding opportunities for local authorities.  
The 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP) draws from the most recent EU policy initiatives. 
Starting with the Europe 2020 strategy, it is built upon a considerable package of EU policies related 
to environmental sustainability such as the climate and energy package, the roadmap for moving to a 
low-carbon economy by 2050, the Resource Efficiency Roadmap, the EU Biodiversity Strategy, as 
well as the blueprint Europe`s water (Endl and Berger 2014, 28). The Action Plan also underscores the 
importance of involving Europe’s cities in the process by acknowledging that cities are already 
implementing many policies in the field of sustainable urban planning and are coming up with 
innovative approaches for urban public transport, sustainable buildings, energy efficiency and urban 
diversity conservation (EAP 2015, 77). 
The Commission’s output of environmental directives has become an important process in the member 
state’s policy cycle to the extent that the creation of an EU directive has turned into a “natural moment” 
to review existing national legislation (SER 2006, 40). The same applies to the sub-national, or local 
policy environment. Legislation enacted by the Commission is of considerable relevance for local 
authorities. Even though the Commissions directives and regulations in this field are primarily 
directed at the national governments of the member states, in nearly all of the cases, local authorities 
are the key actors in implementing the required changes and can therefore be considered as the last 
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arbiters in this regard (Witte 2006, 155). This is amplified when considering the cross-sector character 
of environmental policies, particularly with regard to the European Single Market and the 
liberalization of local service delivery. Unsurprisingly, not all local authorities are in favour of the 
generally ordoliberal course of the EU manifested by policies to promote liberalizing environmental 
services such as drinking water supply, waste management and electricity supply (Witte 2006, 155).  
Although EU law takes precedence and directives have direct effect on national laws, its directives 
still have to be translated into national law first rendering European legislation dependent on national 
and sub-national actors for its implementation.  
If a directive has been successfully implemented by a national government, all other actors will 
henceforth implement national legislation. The original EU directive will then lose most of its 
relevancy for sub-national actors. However, member states do not always succeed in implementing EU 
directives completely, or to the Commission’s satisfaction. In this case, sub-national actors, in addition 
to their national legislation, have to be aware of the exact meaning of the EU directive since it has 
direct vertical effect. This implies that individuals can hold their (sub-)national government 
accountable for failing to implement a EU directive. This principle is a cornerstone of EU law and has 
its origins in the Van Gend & Loos case in which the European Court of Justice ruled that a 
Community law can bestow rights upon individuals independent from the law of a member state. 
Applied to the local realm, it means that local authorities cannot hide behind possible implementation 
deficits from the national government, but can be held directly accountable for non-compliance with 
Community law (Europa Decentraal 2009, 4). As part of this relationship national governments, but 
also local authorities have to predominantly act the part of the faithful implementer without having 
very much manoeuvring room for their own policies (Zwier 34).  
Therefore, local governments are faced with the considerable tasks of maintaining good knowledge of 
the proceedings of EU law. This is essential because they are themselves responsible for recognizing 
that the national government did not successfully translate a directive into national legislation. Of 
course, in cases where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has already pointed out an inconsistency 
with national law, local authorities are not required to make their own judgement, however such 
obvious infringement cases rarely occur and in case of a conflict local governments will be responsible 
to come up with their own judgement on the matter (Europa Decentraal 2009, 6). By doing so, they 
have an obligation to interpret national law in compliance with existing EU law as much as possible 
(Zwier 35). A challenging task for most municipalities because many public administration 
practitioners find themselves confronted with the fact that community law does mostly not present 
itself as a rulebook which clearly covers a specific area, but instead appears as a myriad of regulations 
covering many different sectors and spanning the legislation of a member state in a net-like fashion 
occasionally penetrating its national laws (Fischer 2006, 106).  
 
	 18	
Having established the importance of EU policy for local governments, the following two case studies 
will provide empirical insights from two member states on how local governments are supported by 
their LGA with the implementation of policies originating in Brussels.  
 
6. Case Study: Germany  
 
6.1 How does the political system give shape to local self-governance?  
 
Grounded in the country’s federal structure, the German local government model can be considered as 
one of the strongest types of local government in Europe (Wolmann, 3). The German Basic 
Constitution Law proscribes a high institutional guarantee to the country’s municipalities (Gemeinden), 
the district-free cities (kreisfreie Staedte), and the districts (Landkreise) as being entities of “local self-
administration” (kommunale Selbstverwaltung) which implies that municipalities can “attend all 
matters relevant to the local community in their own existing legislation” (Art. 28, paragraph. 2 Basic 
Constitutional Law). Due to to Germany`s diverse background of having been formed out of 
independent states (Länder), it can be argued that municipalities are more in direct contact with the 
government of their respective federal state, than with the national government. In most cases 
municipalities are involved in supra-local districts (Kreise) to whom they leave the implementation of 
many of the federal policies (Wolmann, 59). Traditionally, there was a perceived need to decentralize 
administrative structures by transferring state responsibilities to the local level (Gabriel 2005, 121). 
Similar to the EU, the principle of subsidiarity is considered a corner stone for handling German 
public affairs. This entails that as long there is no clear entitlement for state or federal authorities to act, 
the local level is generally perceived as the relevant agency (ibid). However, the Länder maintain a 
significant degree of influence. This is because, legally speaking, German municipalities are not 
considered a separate layer of government and instead receive their sovereignty from their respective 
states. Supervision of the local level is exclusively a task left to the states and does not imply any 
direct influence by the federal government (Rechtslexikon 2014).  
Regardless of the many levels of government, they cannot be considered as being part of a strong 
administrative hierarchy. Instead, the German administrative system is defined by a strong need for 
consensus building, due to the high interdependence between the various units of state (Hendriks 1999, 
140). Therefore, “policy making in Germany is commonly a matter of co-governance” (Hesse citied in 
Hendriks 1999, 140). Despite, the official autonomy of local authorities, they have no formal role to 
play in the federal legislative process and find themselves increasingly subject to laws and legislation 
from both the Federal Government and also the European Union. Since the federal level has no direct 
means of organizationally ensuring the implementation of federal legislation, it has to resort to “over-
detailed legal regulation as a crucial resource to direct and control implementation” (Wollmann 2007, 
4).  
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According to the Joint Rules of Procedures of the Federal Ministries (Gemeinsame Geschaeftsordnung 
der Bundesministerien), the LGAs have to be informed on all legislative developments that have a 
direct effect on local authorities (Bundesregierung 2016). They are to be given sufficient opportunity 
to publish their position on relevant legislative proposals. Article 74 goes even further by stating that 
LGAs have to be involved in negotiations regarding relevant EU policies (ibid). However, it is 
important to point out that this does not imply that local authorities have a legal right to negotiate with 
the federal level. In order to voice municipal interests at the federal level, three separate organizations 
have been established. The long organizational history behind their creation is very interesting and 
would deserve more attention, but at this point it does suffice to say that all three organizations are 
organized in a federal manner that include their respective counterparts at the Länder level. First of all, 
the Association of German Cities (Deutscher Städtetag) is the country’s largest national federation of 
municipalities primarily representing the larger cities. Based on the notion of a “community of 
solidarity”, it advocates the cities’ right to self-government in dealings with the Federal Government, 
the federal states, the European Union, in addition to governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. Also, it promotes efficient communal public management practices by providing 
services to its members in the form of policy advice and keeps them informed on everything of 
importance to local governments, as well as functioning as an exchange-platform for its members 
(Deutscher Städtetag 2016).  
The German Town Association (Deutscher Städte und Gemeindebund) represents the middle-size and 
small municipalities in Germany. Its tasks are almost identical to those of the Association of German 
Cities, however its membership base does include far more individual municipalities.  
Finally, the German County Association (Deutscher Landkreistag) is a national association of the 295 
German federal administrative districts (counties). Similar to the other two aforementioned 
organisations, it does also represent the right to local self-governance at the federal level as long as the 
issue affects local governments. Since districts have taken over several of the administrative tasks of 
municipalities, the German Country Association acts in a complimentary manner in policy fields such 
as public service law, local services of general interests (energy, water, waste), transport law, 
environmental law and planning law. Therefore, it is instrumental in promoting sustainable 
development in peripheral urban regions (Landkreistag 2016).  
Despite their being three separate organisations representing the local level in Germany, they do 
frequently communicate their positions commonly under the banner of the Federal Union of 
Communal Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Kommunalen Spitzenverbände).  
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6.2 What are the implications of financial dependence on higher government?   
 
German local governments are, comparatively speaking, more financially independent than many of 
their counterparts on other EU member states. While there are indeed differences between Western 
and Easter German states in terms of dependence on state allocations, local governments draw a 
considerable percentage of their revenue from local taxation. In case where there are considerable 
differences in financial power, a system of fiscal equalization ensures that the less wealthy 
municipalities in a certain state are supported in the execution of their mandatory tasks (Australian 
Government 2016). However, it should be pointed out that the relative financial independence is 
primarily used for mandatory tasks. Even though this system leaves German municipalities with 
considerable leeway in implementing tasks that fall within the voluntary realm such as climate 
protection, they nevertheless find themselves faced with limited financial resources in order to 
maintain discretion in performing various tasks. This is a major issue especially since German 
municipalities only receive spare financial support from the Federal and the Länder government. Kern 
points out that in terms of active local climate change mitigation activities, many municipalities find 
themselves faced with a clear lack of funds in this regard, especially since climate protection is still no 
mandatory tasks for Germany’s municipalities (Kern 2005, 3). Not only do local governments struggle 
to create local enthusiasm for such policies, many operate under the auspices of budgetary discipline 
programs, severely limiting their scope of action with voluntary tasks (ibid).   
This demonstrates that local governments are very likely not to engage in environmental sustainability 
actions if appropriate supporting measures from the the higher levels are not provided. Most 
municipalities lack the financial resources to conduct activities that are not part of their obligatory 
duties and which are not economically profitable. Considering the impact of the recent financial crisis 
on overall governmental finances this situation is still considerably acute. This is supported by a study 
conducted by the LGAs showing that there has been considerable increase in municipal investment 
deficit over the course of the last years (Dst 2016). Also, just as private enterprises, municipalities 
require incentives to increase their effort with regard to climate and energy actions. Local 
governments are in need of signals on what significance should be allocated towards climate 
protection and energy saving in the municipalities sustainability strategies (KfW Bankengruppe 2010, 
33).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 21	
6.3 What support frameworks for local governments are provided?      
 
Environmental policy making in Germany is highly complex and is being described at the federal, 
state and local level. While the federal level lays out the overall policy orientation, it is at the state 
level that environmental laws and regulations are implemented and enforced (Weidner 1995, 31). 
There is still no single Environmental Code in German legislation.  Instead, Germany’s environmental 
law is split into a myriad of specialized statutes very much influenced by constitutional law and 
specifically Article 20a of the Constitution which proclaims that “the state shall protect the natural 
foundations of life and animals by legislation” (German Basic Law 2016). This implies that the 
central government and decentralized public authorities have a legal obligation to this constitutional 
guideline (Glaser 2011, 2).  Based on the commitments on the EU level, it is clear that Germany, as 
the Union’s greatest producer of green house gases, has to contribute substantially by designing 
national supporting schemes for climate and energy-related initiatives. As part of the country’s 
ambitious aim to reduce CO2 emissions by 40% by 2020 via its Climate Action Program, the National 
Climate Initiative (Nationale Klimaschutz Initiative) has been founded in 2008 in order to engage with 
stakeholders from civil society, economy and science to develop innovative solutions. Until 2014 the 
program has provided 550 million euro in funding. The initiative is based on several focal points 
including the inclusion of local governments since it is assumed that Germany will only be able to 
achieve its goals if the potential for energy savings and climate protection are reached on the local 
level (KfW Bankengruppe 2010, 15). As part of this Municipal Directive (Kommunalrichtlinie) 
funding is provided to municipalities and counties, in addition to support with the creation of local 
climate protection strategies. To this date, more than 7000 projects in about 3000 municipalities have 
been funded (BMUB 2016).  
The initiative is actively supported by the German LGAs. In cooperation with the German Institute for 
Urban Studies (Difu) an information hub for municipalities regarding this initiative has been created at 
the German Ministry of Environment (Service und Komptenzzentrum Kummunaler Klimaschutz). It 
provides municipalities with access to funding, technical information, best practices and networking 
opportunities (BMUB 2016b). The initiative partially is a response to a serious lack of qualified staff 
within municipalities for the creation of concrete energy and climate protection schemes. By providing 
up to 65% of staff costs, this initiative couples local governments to full-time climate protection 
consultants. It’s most prominent service is the organisation of an annual competition (Klimaaktive 
Kommune) in which municipalities active in climate mitigation are awarded a financial prize to be 
invested into more relevant activities. By doing so, the competition does not mark the end of activities, 
but provides a point of departure and motivation for continuation, optimization and new activities 
(Difu 2016, 4). The competition is carried out as a joint initiative by the Ministry for Environment 
together with Difu and the three national LGA. It is based around three themes which address 
municipalities conducting projects by means of cooperation with local actors such as businesses, by 
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integrating and motivating the local citizenship to engage in activities related to climate protection, in 
addition to promoting cross-sector solutions to facilitate both climate protection and climate mitigation 
(Difu 2016, 2,3). The competition enjoys a considerable outreach with every year more than 100 local 
governments, of all sizes, handing in applications (BMUB 2016).  
 
Given the strong connection between local governments and their respective state, it comes at no 
surprise that the Länder level is also an important provider of subsidies and support program for local 
governments. While providing a comprehensive account of all initiatives from the different states 
would go above the limitations of this thesis, the fact remains that the municipalities first and foremost 
engage with their respective Länder either by direct participation in support programs, or supported by 
their state-level LGA. Services in the field of environmental sustainability directed at municipalities 
differ from state to state, but are all based around the formation of state-level sustainability strategies 
(Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie). The most used form of state-level appears to be the organisation of local 
sustainability alliances. The state of Hesse organizes a project on local climate protection “Hessen 
aktiv – 100 Kommunen fuer den Klimaschutz” as part of its sustainability strategy in which 
municipalities commit to a drastic reduction on CO2 emissions by signing a Charta (Bensheim 2016). 
The Länder also offer a considerable array of funding and free-of-charge expertise for municipalities 
through cooperation with non stake-actors such as ICLEI (International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives) as is the case in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate (RheinlandPfalz 2016). It 
is at the state-level that the capacity building functions of LGA appear to be most pronounced. Not 
only do they appear to participate in state-wide climate alliances, they also provide expertise and 
encourage knowledge sharing through seminars, or even maintain internet portals with the aim of 
creating a multiplier effect in which municipalities can share best practices in the field of renewable 
energy. Such portals also serve the purpose of providing technical expertise (RheinlandPfalz 2016, 3).  
 
Overseeing all potential support possibilities is a tremendous task for municipal staff given the many 
different options. This has consequences for the willingness of municipalities to participate in tenders 
since it is often thought that doing so involves considerable effort, especially since it is not clear if the 
most favourable funding opportunities are indeed found. Also, the multitude of different subsidy 
conditions and application procedures results in uncertainty regarding which subsidies can be used for 
which purposes. This can result in municipalities deciding not to pursue funding possibilities due to 
the conditions being perceived as unfavourable (KfW Bankengruppe 2010, 56).  
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6.4 What kind of attention is there towards the EU among local governments?  
 
While local government in Germany is clearly positioned behind the Lander in terms of influencing 
national and EU policies, an increasing number of cities run their own EU-coordination offices in 
order to be aware changes in EU legislation and to pursue EU funding. Generally speaking, it is in the 
large cities were most of these offices can be found. Schaechtelin has shown that, in case of Baden-
Wuertemberg, all of its largest cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants have a full-time coordinator 
for EU-matters. Even though there appears to be an upwards trend in this regard, cities with lower 
population tend to be less likely to have such an office (Schaechtelin 2009, 159). This discrepancy can 
be explained by decreased financial, or human resource capacity in smaller cities, especially when 
considering that EU-matters are often perceived as complex and complicated, not least with regard to 
application procedures for EU subsidy programs. This does even apply to cities with a EU-coordinator. 
Because of this, the LGA of the state has decided to hold twice annual working groups in which 
coordinators can engage in networking with their counterparts from other cities (Schaechtelin 2009, 
160). A remedy for this initial inertia by local governments to actively consider developments on the 
EU-level, especially in smaller local governments, is provided by the Brussels office of several 
Laender. Acting as the listening post, Länder LGA share a common office space from which they 
disperse a weekly newspaper titled ‘Brusssel Aktuell” in order to communicate all information from 
the European institutions relevant to local governments as soon as possible (Schaechtelin 2009, 166). 
Also, the EU-office serves as an intermediator between several cities for common pursuit of EU-
tenders, in addition to providing presentations and workshops on EU-matters of importance to local 
governments (ebbk 2016).  Nevertheless, a study conducted by Difu has shown that when asked about 
the viability of their EU-activities 64% of local governments were of the opinion that there was little 
to very little return to be gained from engaging with the EU. Even more so, 74% were of the opinion 
the financial opportunities provided by the EU were inadequate (Alemann 2013, 30). This is supported 
by the fact that most smaller municipalities are unaware of the intermediatory role played by LGA 
EU-representation offices simply because the required funding to extensively deal with European 
matters is too small (Alemann 2013, 32). In many cases, even if an attempt is made applying for EU 
tenders a certain degree of EU-fatigue tends to kick in due to not only the complicated nature of the 
application process, but also due to considerable accounting procedures afterwards. (Alemann 2013, 
33).  
To facilitate greater access to EU funding, the federal ministry of Environment has created a web 
portal for municipalities which provides guidance and a clear overview of funding possibilities for 
local governments (EU-kommunal Förderkompass). Most emphasis is put on the potential to tapping 
into the European Structure and Investment Fonds (ESI) and, in most cases, it is the states that manage 
the application criteria (Umweltbundesamt 2016, 40). The LGAs do not appear to have an active stake 
in this initiative.  
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6.5 How do local governments adapt to European policy?     
 
Although local governments have to consider national legislation first, the prospect of new EU 
legislation is often seen as an intervention in the municipality’s right to self-governance.  
EU policies reach into policy areas, that traditionally in Germany, have been organised in a public 
manner and influences municipalities with regard to their public-private-partnerships, inter-municipal 
cooperation state aid, public procurement, planning right, integration polies and environmental 
policies (Witte 2005, 163). In fact, the EU is often perceived as an enemy who overly adheres to open 
market principles (ibid). Many public electricity utilities are subject to higher pressure from 
competition and consequently have to align their policies more with economic interests as opposed to 
environment and climate protection criteria. This has resulted in a situation in which more 
municipalities stop acting as shareholders in electricity production and focus solely on grid 
maintenance (Kern 2005, 16).  
Generally, while some of the main tasks of local governments in the fields of social services, land 
planning and energy planning are set out as being compulsory, traditionally German local authorities 
are allowed to run their own public utilities (Stadtwerke) as a voluntary task and actual policies 
performed may differ from one community to another since local needs might differ (Gabriel 2005, 
121, 122). More often than not, local governments choose to involve private associations to relieve 
themselves from several tasks. Not only does this limit the scope of action a municipality has in terms 
of increasing sustainable energy solutions, this also cuts of the option of using public utilities as 
subsidy generators for more sustainable public transportation (Kern 2005, 17). This occurs in several 
areas of local competence and is specifically often seen with regard to water and energy supply, 
sewage disposal and urban planning (ibid). This practise is generally in line with New Public 
Management views of decentralization and has been amplified by EU legislation on the liberalization 
of the market for public service delivery. Still, local governments in Germany were soon to realize that 
the privatization of service delivery did not provide the desired quality improvement. Instead, private 
service providers would frequently raise prices while deteriorating the working condition of 
employees (Wolmann 2011, 15).  Recently, German municipalities have begun to re-municipalize 
public service utilities. This is based on the assumption that public authorities should keep influence in 
matters regarding the environment, which supersede pure control functions (Witte 2006, 155). Given 
that many municipal concessions were scheduled for renewal many local governments seized the 
chance to re-municipalize public utilities in order to generate municipal revenue, in addition to 
expressing a renewed appreciation for a political rationality which has the best interest of the local 
community at heart (Wolmanm 2011, 16). As a matter of fact, Wolmann claims that the European 
Commission has begun to support this practice “by exerting pressure on the Big Four (E.on, RWE, 
EnBW, Vattenfall) to sell their local grids and give up previously acquired minority shares in 
Stadtwerke” (Wolmann 2011, 20). Still, it is likely that pressure from the Commission stems more 
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from a desire to increase competition in the electricity and gas market and to arrive at more consumer 
friendly-prices overall, instead of having the financial well-being of local authorities in mind (DW 
2008). Nevertheless, together with the fact that re-municipalisation is also observed in other sectors 
such as in water-and waste management indicates that there is no denying that local authorities are 
increasingly regaining important leverage for the implementation of their own local environmental 
sustainability policies by means of increasing their control on local utilities.  
The fact that local activity to re-municipalize local public service delivery is considered a key step 
towards local environmental sustainability is supported by the LGA. In a joint publication the 
organizations call upon local authorities to foster the participation between citizens (mostly by means 
of coopertives) and local public utilities in the interest of climate protection by providing best practise 
examples (Dst 2016).  
 
A similar example of absorption of EU legislation by local governments is the Water Framework 
Directive which has been translated into German federal law meaning local governments have an 
obligation to maintain good ecological quality of water bodies, to ensure an adequate supply of high 
quality drinking water (Bund 2016). The directive has been received with great scepticism by local 
governments in Germany when it was first introduced at the start of the new millennium. Although the 
final directive deals primarily with the protection of water bodies there was growing unease among 
municipalities that the directive could also cover the privatization of the municipal water supply. 
While the final directive did not include any direct reference to liberalization, local authorities saw 
themselves faced with the prospect of forced liberalization. According to the Commission, 
concessions, as one of the most common forms of public-private-partnerships, were not subject to any 
clear and unambiguous provisions. This resulted in a loophole which “could give rise to potentially 
serious distortion of the internal market such as direct awards of contracts without any competition 
(with associated risks off national favouritism, fraud and corruption) and generates considerable 
inefficiencies” (European Commission 2013). However, municipalities were concerned that this 
would be a disguised attempt by the Commission to apply internal market principles to the domestic 
water supply effectively ending “both local political control over a vital resource and to water access 
as a human right” (Boscheck 136, 3). Even though there is no direct obligation to privatize, the public 
utility has to comply with a new set of conditions if it wants to keep providing services exclusively. In 
case a municipality cannot comply with these conditions, it would have to inevitably put particular 
services out for tender. According to the water laws of the different German states, the drinking water 
supply and waste water disposal is the obligation of the different municipalities (ATT 2015, 18). 
Because stipulations may differ from state to state, the water utilities can have several forms of 
organisations, however as in Germany “water supply and water disposal are core duties of public 
services in the general interest within the competence of the municipalities or other public 
corporations” (ATT 2015, 10), local governments always retain a significant degree of influence. 
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When the EU directive was proposed it was feared that this would subject the German local water 
supply market to EU market liberalization similarly to the electricity market. Witte shows that there 
was considerable doubt whether a liberalisation would indeed result in cost savings at the consumer 
end. Not much differently from the local electricity market, experts frequently point to the fact that a 
privatization of local utilities does not necessarily have to result in an increase in efficiency, but 
instead results in a deterioration of quality and working conditions since private undertakings are 
primarily profit-oriented.  This viewpoint has been especially put forward by the LGAs in a petition to 
the federal government and the EU to explicitly scrap water supply from the directive in the interest of 
preserving local self-governance and the supply of water by local public utilities as being the closest to 
citizens. The LGAs argue that the directive is contrary to the Lisbon Treaty which acknowledges the 
importance of local self-governance with regard to public service (DSt 2013).    
 
In terms of supporting measures for practical implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive 
by LGAs the most notable example appears to be the case of Lower Saxony where the state-level LGA 
has introduced so called “area cooperations” which were supposed to devise appropriate measures for 
water bodies until 2009. These cooperations were comprised of representatives from different 
municipalities who together came up with solutions based on best-practice examples from their 
respective locality (Witte 2005, 162). Such working groups, which have appeared within several states 
also demonstrate the good working relations between the LGAs and the respective Environment 
Ministry of the Land. In the case of Lower Saxony these areas of cooperation were supported by the 
ministry through the establishment of an information platform run by the German Municipal 
Environmental Campaign U.A.N (Kommunale Umwelt-Aktion U.A.N), which is closely linked to the 
LGAs, on the implementation of the directive. By providing trainings, seminars and workshops to 
local officials, the platform encourages the development of praxis-orientated solutions, development 
of municipal networks and stimulates the, competition-based, exchange of best-practices (U.A.N. 
2016).  
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7. Case Study: The Netherlands 
 
7.1 How does the political system give shape to local self-governance?    
 
The Netherlands refers to itself as a decentralised unitary state in which “different tasks are carried out 
at different levels whereby daily practice involves the three government levels making work 
agreements (Figee 2008, 15). This implies that the state does not function based on hierarchical 
steering, but instead depends on “mutual adjustment between the three active organs of the state: 
central government, provincial government and local government” (Toonen citied in Hendriks and 
Tops 1999, 138). Both the local, as well as the provincial levels have to comply with the bounded 
autonomy principle which means that they have general competences, but also have a dependence 
upon and are constrained by the national government (ibid).  However, the Dutch unitary state system 
is not solely based on hierarchical relations. Often described as a system of shared governance in a 
decentralised unitary state, the contemporary political system is strongly based on the ideas of Johan 
Rudolph Thorbecke who pushed for appreciation of horizontal forms of power sharing between the 
national legislator and a regional, or local executive (Toonen 2010, 8). The relation between 
government levels in the Dutch “unitary” state has to be interpreted as being more consensus-driven in 
which participation of relevant stakeholders and interests in the decision-making process form the 
bases for policy making (Toonen 2010, 9). It can be argued that the unitary state system in the 
Netherlands is the reason why action to tackle a certain issue is often taken right at the heart of society, 
even if this regards issues of national importance (Figee 2008, 16).  
Toonen argues that the Dutch system of territorial governance focuses mostly on the local, not the 
regional level. This grants municipalities in the Netherlands with “functional participation” in 
conducting overall public affairs guaranteed by two fundamental principles embedded in Dutch 
constitutional law namely autonomy (autonomie) and co-governance (medebewind). In Dutch 
Constitutional Law the concept of autonomy grants municipalities (and provinces) the liberty to 
regulate their own household by making use of their “right to initiative to legislate own affairs without 
prior approval of higher authority”. It is important to point out the autonomy principle therefore does 
not simply refer to insulation and protection from central government (Toonen 2010, 7). This does 
apply to policies which the local government deems necessary, as long as there are no regulations 
from a higher authority in place (Schaap 2012, 6). Dutch law has a special concept in place that limits 
the autonomy of local governments and local authorities. Medebewind is the overarching principle that 
governs the decentralisation of national policies by obliging local authorities to implement national 
legislation (Schaap 2012, 4). This is being done quite extensively as about 70-85 percent of current 
municipal activities are being implemented under the umbrella of the central authority (Rijksoverheid) 
(Elzinga cited in Breeman 2014, 27). In response to the growing number of municipal tasks 
organisational innovations such as agreements between the different tiers of government often formed 
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by means of “concordats”, “agreements”, and “consultation agreements” have proliferated over the 
course of the last years (Jas 2008, 2). Their prominent role in Dutch policy-making can be explained 
as being a direct result of consensus-based administrative system which “leaves little institutional 
opportunity for unchecked unilateral administrative or political action” (Toonen 2010, 11). Instead this 
system requires the participation, coproduction and cooperation between many institutional interests, 
in addition to political and social stakeholders all of which are interdependent to each other(ibid).  
Still, the autonomy prerogative is far from negligible and “plays and important role in tailoring 
national overall policies to local circumstances and creating policy- and organisational innovations in 
the process” (Toonen 2010, 7). This was based on the recognition that “quality can only be assessed 
and established in a system of mutual participation, where trust and mutual adjustment prevail” 
(Toonen 2010, 24). 
 
The title of most important lobby instrument for Dutch municipalities towards the national 
government belongs to the Vereiniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG). More than a century ago 
Dutch municipalities, having acknowledged their financial dependence on the national government, in 
addition to the percussions of national legislation on municipal affairs founded the VNG in order to 
safeguard their interests vis-à-vis the central government. Its prominence in domestic politics far 
surpasses that of other city networks to the point that “government and parliament know well that no 
legislation can be passed without the municipalities voicing their opinions through the VNG” (Figee 
2008, 57). It is particularly striking how well positioned this LGA is within the inter-governmental 
levels of cooperation. Different from Germany, there appears to be very little concern from the 
municipal side in terms of underrepresentation at the national level when it comes to European affairs. 
As a matter of fact, both local authorities and the central government have stated that cooperation 
works exceptionally well, both within the negotiation phase, as well as the implementation phase 
(BZK 2015, 10). By means of participation in an interdepartmental working group on the assessment 
of new Commission proposals (Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen) decentral government 
bodies are represented by their LGA. Every year the VNG is asked to identify priority issues for local 
authorities which will be discussed in the separate departments. The Ministry of Infrastructure of 
Environment (I&M) even appoints one person to act as a contact point for decentral governments with 
regard to European issues (BZK 2015, 6). In terms of actual gain, local authorities and the central 
government proclaim that it primarily derives from the sharing of the other party’s knowledge and 
networks. The central government explicitly mentions using the expertise of local governments for the 
attainment of insights into the consequences of EU proposals for the regional and local levels (BZK 
2015, 80).  
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7.2 What are the implications of financial dependence on higher government?  
 
Comparatively speaking, Dutch municipalities are, in part due to the historically unitary nature of the 
country, highly dependent on the central government for finances. This stems from a time when 
municipalities were smaller and a redistribution of finances by the central government was considered 
the easiest way to maintain uniform level of public service provision (Publiek Denken 2016). In terms 
of generating their own revenue, raising local taxes is the best option, however, nowadays total 
municipal income from taxes consists only around 7 to 15 percent of total income (Backes 2013, 248). 
The considerable dependence on the central government’s municipality fund (Gemeentefonds) implies 
that municipalities “share proportionally in budget cuts and extra expenditure by the central 
government” (ibid). This does results in serious policy implementation risks since municipalities can 
be faced with unexpected setbacks, and therefore might be forced to overspend and draw from their 
reserves. Such risks accumulate when considering that local governments in the Netherlands have to 
deal with a large number of tasks when compared to other EU states (CBS 2014). As a matter of fact, 
dependence on the central government is so dominant that the VNG considers the current situation to 
pose a threat to local democracy, as the central government has a disproportionate indirect leverage on 
local affairs. The VNG therefore lobbies for an expansion of local taxation competences, and long-
term financial stability. Redistribution models are not only supposed to arrange uniform allocation of 
finances, but also have to be flexible enough to follow developments and to reward innovative policy 
(VNG 2015, 3).  
 
7.3 What support frameworks for local governments are provided?     
 
The 4th National Environment Plan (Nationaal Milieuplan NMP) was established laying out criteria for 
sustainable development and environmental policy until 2030. This plan recognises the fact that many 
(global) environmental issues, such as the emission of CO2, are problems that cannot be solved in 
only a few years. The plan also provides a clear explanation on what governance level is the most 
suitable for tackling certain problems. For instance, CO2 emission reduction requires a global 
perspective whereas environmental acidification is best grounded in a European approach since it is 
directly linked to the European Single Market. The plan calls for an increasing decentralization of 
policies and an increase of local and regional competence (NMP 2001).  
The NMP stands on the legal framework provided for by the Dutch Environmental Management Law 
(Wet Milieubeheer). Article 4 of the Environmental Law specifically encourages local governments to 
create a municipal environmental policy plan in which it stipulates the focal points for the local 
council with regard to the environment (Rijksoverheid 2016). However, it should be noted that the law 
does not strictly require local governments to create this plan due to the fact that many environmental 
problems do supersede the municipal level (Milieufocus 2008). Until April 2003 municipalities were 
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required to set-up an annual environmental program (milieuprogramma) in which concrete 
environmental measures with regard to the communal environmental competences for the following 
year were being laid out. This requirement has been scraped due to the fact that municipalities often 
simply did not create such a programme even though it was required by law. Instead its role was often 
being carried out by working programs outside of the national law, in addition to integration of 
environmental actions in the municipalities financial plan (ibid). Therefore, it would appear that even 
though such a programme was demanded by national law, local government did not implement it, 
most likely because this would have demanded additional (financial) resources.   
 
Nevertheless, a special climate agreement between the VNG and the central government has been 
signed (Klimaatakkoord Gemeenten en Rijk 2007-2011) which demonstrates the high esteem in which 
the VNG is held by the central government with regard to local government representation. The 
central government stimulates the importance of knowledge sharing among municipalities and with 
other levels of government.  The agreement is based around the formation of a national adaptation 
program (Nationaal Programma Adaptatie Ruimte en Klimaat) in which the VNG, the Association of 
Provinces (Interprovinciaal Overleg) and the Association of Waterboards (Unie van Waterschappen) 
work on a climate-proof country. For this purpose, the VNG will provide information on the long-term 
climate goals per sector and which actions municipalities will take (VNG 2007, 5). The municipalities 
will therefore be granted the leeway and time to focus on reaching the climate environmental 
sustainability goals (VNG 2007, 6). The program is being continued by a nation-wide initiative by the 
Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (Rijkswaterstaat) to support decentral authorities to 
become climate neutral by 2050. As part of the Local Climate Action Program (Lokaal Klimaat 
Actieprogramma) decentral authorities are supported by means of a community of practise in which 
around 1.100 participants from 293 municipalities, waterboards and provinces participate in action 
teams centred around topics related to environmental sustainability (Mansveld 2015, 5). The VNG 
provided a guideline on the possible subsidy possibilities local governments can draw from. Most 
notably it has been the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment which has created a financial 
stimulus for local governments to engage in climate initiatives by means of a special program directed 
at municipalities and provinces (Stimulering Lokale Klimaatinitiativen). The provinces also provide 
financial support with more specific conditions (VNG 2008).  
 
With regard to supportive actions, it would appear that the VNG’s main support services are aligned 
with the SER Energy Agreement (SER Energieakkoord). Implemented in 2013 the Agreement has 
been established as a result of multi-stakeholder consultations between government actors, including 
the VNG, next to social organisation and environmental non-governmental-organisations. The 
involved parties have committed themselves to a long-term vision for a realistic energy and climate 
policy which does enable safer investments into the sector (SER 2013). The Agreement acknowledges 
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that municipalities have an important role to play with the enforcement of the Environmental 
Management Law as local governments are considered to be the primary facilitators of local and 
regional concrete renewable energy projects (ibid). 
Following the conclusion of the Energieakkord the VNG launched an energy support program as it 
appeared that as an increasing number of local governments are actively carrying out local renewable 
energy projects, this also resulted in an increase in demand for support in the form of information and 
knowledge exchange and expertise (VNG 2013). The aim of the support program is to facilitate the 
formation of partnerships between local governments and technical businesses and civil society with 
the aim of promoting local and regional energy saving and sustainable energy production, with an 
emphasis on urban environments. The programme has been designed to enable Dutch regions to ask 
the VNG for support for the formation and maintaining of regional partnerships. This is mostly being 
done by the deployment of coordinators who are appointed by the VNG.  In addition, the VNG, 
together with central knowledge centres, provides a considerable range of “knowledge products” on 
how to organize local workshops and how to make use of existing tools concerning local 
environmental sustainability, particularly renewable energy deployment. A prime aspect of the support 
offered by VNG is directed at facilitating alliances between municipalities, civil society organizations 
and companies on a regional level. Looking at the details of this programme reveals that the VNG acts 
primarily as a facilitator of knowledge and a capacity builder. For the implementation of the first 
programme the VNG has received 15 million euro under the national agreement. The second 
programme is paid for by its own funds.  
Also, given a tradition of benchmarking among local service providers as mentioned above, 
the International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG 
International) has been instrumental, together with three partners, in promoting a local sustainability 
monitor (Lokale Duurzaamheidsmeter) which has been properly in place since 2004. Based on the 
three dimensions of sustainable development (people, planet, profit) the monitor invites Dutch 
municipalities to fill out a set of yes/no questions that are meant to give an indication of a 
municipality’s sustainability (Klein2016). By doing so a chain of cause-effect relations between policy 
outputs and policy outcomes can be established. Although the tool uses self-reported data to explain 
the differences in local sustainability performance of Dutch municipalities, it nevertheless provides 
valuable data on which municipalities can be considered front-runners (Hoppe and Coenen 2011, 230).  
Building on this tool, the VNG, maintains a website (lokale energie etalage) on which municipalities 
can compare their progress with regard to local renewable energy generation through a set of 
indicators. The prioritization of environmental targets on the local level does also receive a new 
coating under the umbrella of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In addition to this, the 
strategy calls for clear measurement of progress by means of reporting and monitoring.  
This is especially being done by building on its successful Millienium Municipality Campaign 
(Millenium Gemeente Campagne), which ran from 2010-2015, it has introduced the Global Goals 
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Campaign which is directly aligned with the 17 SDGs. Involved municipalities become active by 
communicating and raising awareness about the SDGs, by facilitating local stakeholder participation, 
and by aligning their own policies with the SDGs together with other local governments by means of 
regional meetings. VNG International provides a “Menu of Inspiration” which provides municipalities 
an idea of the kind of policies they can take to support implementation of the SDGs at the local level 
(VNG 2016). Every year one local government is bestowed upon the title of “most inspirational 
Global Goals Municipality” based on its achievements and citizen’s engagement with local 
sustainability. In order to increase national awareness, VNG International travels the country with a 
small time capsule in which mayors, citizens, schools and the municipal council can express their 
wishes for 2030. As part of the campaign, VNG International is involved in dialogue with national 
ministries, large companies, in addition to development and environmental organisations (VNG 2016). 
 
7.4 What kind of attention is there towards the EU among local governments?  
  
Most municipalities in The Netherlands are primarily interested in EU issues for funding purposes. De 
Rooij has shown that EU affairs are only rarely on most local council agendas and if they are its it is in 
regard to EU funds, often as a component of other items (De Rooij 2002, 456). Cities often face 
considerable hurdles in their application procedures. Not only do their own financial capacities limit 
the amount of time that can be invested in applying for EU funds, the fact that they are eligible for 
funding alone does not suffice. The `co-finance principle` ensures that projects funded by the 
Commission have to be partially paid for by the recipient party itself in order to ensure integrity of the 
project. Even though this is only a small part of the total required funding, it is still often perceived as 
a considerable hurdle for many local governments (De Rooij 2003, 101). While it is indeed the 
European Commission that decides eligibility, it is the Dutch national government that decides which 
of the eligible municipalities will ultimately receive project funding. The Commission serves as a 
subjective decision maker, whereas it is the national government that makes the political decision. 
This implies that a municipality’s engagement with EU-funding is essentially played on two boards 
(De Rooij, 2002, 455). Given the traditional institutional set-up in The Netherlands and the dominantly 
top-down influence of the national government on municipalities as explained earlier is likely to 
contribute to this situation. De Rooij claims that it is primarily the large municipalities which have the 
highest attention directed towards EU-matters, mostly due to their larger financial capacity. This is 
supported by a recent study showing that municipal size and population density do indeed have an 
effect on whether or not local governments have developed a Europe strategy. Smaller municipalities 
tend to face more problems with applying for EU subsidies (Muller 2013). Larger municipalities show 
a more proactive attitude with regard to the EU. They consider the EU to be more important for 
achieving local goals which is also related to the fact that they tend to actively lobby in liaison with 
other local governments in Brussels effectively increasing their chance of receiving subsidies (ibid). 
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Be this as it may, Muller has shown that population size is not necessarily the predominant factor. 
Instead, smaller municipalities paying some attention to the EU in which the city council is aware of 
relevant EU legislation and where the knowledge and experience of its employees was considered 
higher showed a significant increase in (successful) subsidy applications (Muller 2015, 64).   
In terms of passing on information “down” from Brussels to local governments, this role is being 
fulfilled by Europa Decentraal, a judicial knowledge-institute housed in the same building as VNG. 
The organization provides all local authorities access to information regarding European legislation 
free of charge. The free nature of this service can significantly increase the willingness of (small- and 
medium sized) municipalities to stay up to date of European matters. The VNG supports local 
governments, not only by publishing a EU subsidy guide (Europese Subsidewijzer), but also in the 
form of advisory sessions and by maintaining a network of local officials with experience in European 
matters (VNG 2014). In the field of environmental sustainability, the Europa Decentraal provides 
quarterly-updated information on EU climate, energy and environmental policies. Still, local 
government’s inquiries regarding EU legislation do often not concern these topics. In fact, only 2% of 
all questions received deal with these issues. Most of the questions concern EU public procurement 
rules and governmental subsidies (Europa Decentraal 2016, 35).  
 
7.5 How do local government adapt to European policy?    
 
The EU-induced liberalization of the electricity sector also serves as an example here as it did indeed 
have an effect on the local level, however, it’s effect differed profoundly from the German case due to 
the fact that in The Netherlands the production and distribution of electricity was primarily located at 
the provincial level and only several of the larger cities had their own electricity utilities. It was only 
until the EU energy liberalization directives and national policy to increase economies of scale that it 
became attractive for these local governments to sell their shares in electricity companies (Burger 
2001, 15). A study by CBS has shown that municipalities have received a considerable amount of 
finances of which most have been used for further investments, however it appears that the gross of 
those finances were not invested in sustainable energy or environmental policies (CBS 2012). 
Nevertheless, in the liberalized electricity market an increasing number of municipalities are seeing 
the opportunity to participate in local sustainable energy companies (lokale duurzaame 
energiebedrijven). This often happens by means of regional cooperation between municipalities in 
which either a new company or an energy cooperative is being created (hieropgewekt 2015, 18).  
There can be several reasons for local governments to do this such as the fact that it can be more 
efficient to reach local environmental goals in this manner, or because it is more financially efficient 
to outsource tasks to a third legal entity due to internal financial cutbacks (Rijkswaterstaat 2013, 22). 
However, in most cases a municipality would go through different stages of involvement before 
becoming a co-producer of local electricity. Participation of municipalities in local sustainable energy 
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companies is by no means self-evident as this is not included in its mandatory legal duties. Therefore, 
a municipality is by no means obliged to participate in such an undertaking. Be this as it may, local 
government participation is becoming increasingly popular and can be considered to fall within a 
greater tendency towards a knowledge-based approach in which different municipalities cooperate in 
developing an initiative (Rijkswaterstaat 2013). This is actively being supported by the Dutch LGA. In 
2014 the VNG, together with two network companies and knowledge-platform HIER created a 
support program for local sustainable energy initiatives called HIER opgewekt. Drawing on internal 
knowledge all parties provide information on initiatives and cooperate on drawing up innovative 
services targeted at energy initiatives (hieropgewekt 2016). In order to kick-start this project, the VNG, 
in cooperation with several non-state actors, has conducted a positive study on the social value of local 
sustainable energy production and provides local governments with a financial-economic business 
case including a calculation model to be used for the promotion of such initiatives (VNG 2013, 5).   
 
The Implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in The Netherlands also provides an 
interesting case for local government adaptation. Historically and due to its geographical position, the 
country has been engaged in multi-level water regulation policies for centuries in which the 
municipalities are responsible for waste water regulation, spatial planning and environmental 
management. The provinces for their part oversee ground water and earth removal. This provided 
considerable hurdles for the implementation of the directive, since it divided the country according to 
international water catchments making it unclear which government level would be responsible for 
which catchment (Dekker 2010, 140). The Netherlands did not choose to adapt the existing regulatory 
framework, but instead to create new institutional consultation arrangements. This proved especially 
fruitful as many local authorities found themselves situated in several water catchments, resulting not 
only in more cross-border cooperation, as intended by the directive in the first place, but also fostered 
cooperation and consultation on a national and regional level in the form of a national water council 
(Nationaal Wateroverleg), in addition to several other regional councils. It is important to point out 
that the practice of engaging different advisory council in the negotiation process is a prime example 
of the Dutch consensus-driven Poldermodel (Dekker 2010, 145). The VNG participated in this forum 
effectively pushing for concrete solutions on the local level in the form of placing advisors in 
municipalities in order to support local implementation while leaving the responsibility with the local 
council (Dekker 2010, 146). In total 26 such advisors (gemeenteambassadeurs water), of which one is 
active at VNG as a national coordinator, have been placed in the seven water catchments. Their role is 
to maintain motivation within the local councils for proper implementation of water-related policy 
goals, in addition to fostering the coordination between different municipalities and other levels of 
government (Noordzeeloket 2007, 14).  The VNG also plays a role in addressing the central 
government on the matter of the directive. In fact, it appears that despite implementation of the 
directive in the National Adaptation Strategy, the central government is currently considering 
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implementing a measure to hold local governments more financially accountable for waste water 
disposal. The VNG argues that this goes in fact against EU “polluter pays principle”. Nevertheless, in 
the light of a yet unsuccessful implementation of the requirements contained in the directive, the 
central government has pushed for the creation of a new program to which the VNG will demonstrate 
municipal commitment by signing a declaration of intend (VNG 2016).  
 
8. Synthesis: Coupling Variables and Theory  
 
The case studies explored the way in which Local Government Associations act as a catalyst for 
municipality’s efforts to pursue environmental sustainability policies. It was hoped that a better 
understanding of the domestic context in which these organizations operate, as well as the services 
they provide would demonstrate that they have a complementary role to transnational European 
networks. The study was based on the following research question:  
 
How do Local Government Associations foster the implementation of environmental sustainability 
policies in the context of EU legislation? 
 
Independent variables in the form of sub-questions were researched in order to provide evidence for 
claims about variances in the dependent variable on the background of the theoretical framework. In 
order to allow for cross-case comparison the sub-question have been answered by focusing on fixed 
indicators. In both case studies positive evidence for the indicators has been found. In the following a 
comparative synthesis of the independent variables with regard to the theories will be provided.  
 
The dependent variable had been defined as the bottom-up implementation of environmental 
sustainability policies. Therefore, the most important factor was researching whether the issues 
addressed in the independent variables did indeed call for “processes of learning, capacity and 
support-building in order to address policy problems in a decentralized way consistent with the 
interests of the actors involved” (Ingram and Schneider cited in Knill 2007, 153).  
This required the researcher to look at the multi-level processes which shape local capacity and will 
for sustainable development (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, 48) by considering evidence for a governance 
regime without clear cut hierarchies between administrative levels and interactions between different 
policy stakeholders from various government levels. Kamal-Chaoui explained that due to vertical 
integration between jurisdictions actions taken at the different political levels may act as a constraint 
or an enabling force for higher or lower levels (Kamal-Chaoui 2009, 9). Therefore, the main 
assumption of this thesis was that depending on the domestic context there are differences in how 
Type II multi-level governance will take shape. This is arguably the case in both Germany and The 
Netherlands and there appears to be a fundamental difference with regard to the position of local 
governments within the domestic political arena. While in Germany municipalities do not legally form 
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a government entity on their own, but are considered to fall within the supervision of their respective 
Land, in The Netherlands they are under direct control of the central government and not the provinces. 
This appears to have primarily implications in the kind of financial independence local governments 
enjoy. The case studies have shown that even though the German municipalities enjoy a higher 
financial independence than their Dutch counterparts, in both countries there are nevertheless 
considerable financial limits to local government’s capacity to engage in creative sustainable solutions. 
In order to support local governments large-scale support frameworks have been set up at different 
government levels. It is at this point that LGAs serve as important intermediators in a system of multi-
level governance. Be it through the formation of concordats in The Netherlands, where the VNG is 
regarded as an integral representative of municipalities’ interests, or an advisory role of German and 
Dutch LGAs with regard to the establishment of an information and networking hub, it is clear LGAs 
have a complementary role in a system in which governance is “dispersed across multiple centres of 
authority” (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 233). Despite, but also because, of this “vertical” control in the 
form of financial supervision by higher government levels LGAs have a key role in providing local 
governments with information on subsidy possibilities and encouraging participation in competitions 
centred around environmental sustainability.  
Both Type I and Type II multi-level governance, appear to be the applicable to how local governments 
in both countries give shape to the implementation of higher level policies in which citizens are not 
served by “the government, but by a variety of different public service industries” (Hooge and Marks 
2003, 237). This is also where the theoretical connections between multi-level governance and top-
down Europeanization becomes clear. Analysing the examples of electricity market liberalization and 
the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in both case studies has shown that processes 
of top-down Europeanization, that is the translation of EU directives into national law, give rise to 
both types of multi-level governance as directives initiated at EU level appeared to have a profound 
effect on how local governments can give shape to local initiatives. The examples provided in the case 
studies fall well within Dossi’s definition of top down-Europeanization which entails that domestic 
systems of governance are changed in time within EU-wide arenas and are “eventually used by 
domestic actors to shape their institutional orders” (Dossi 2012, 161). In both countries top down-
Europeanization pressure to liberalize domestic electricity markets has given rise to different kinds of 
Type II multi-level governance arrangements in which local governments become involved in local 
electricity production often by means of public-private-partnerships. Arguably, in the German case 
cities have a traditionally high stake in public utilities. It is therefore all the more striking that the 
VNG appears to have a more dominant role in the facilitation of network-based horizontal approaches 
through the facilitation of such initiatives. This has also been shown with the case with regard to water 
management as good examples of Type II governance can be seen. While the initial reaction by 
German local governments and the national LGAs to emphasize the importance of local self-
governance in matters of water management tends to point towards evidence for Type I multi-level 
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governance, the subsequent actions by the LGAs to promote multi-level cooperation tends to 
encourage Type II governance as a response to top-down Europeanization. Therefore, it appears that 
the independent variable of the political system and the subsequent institutional context can indeed be 
considered a crucial factor governing the way in which LGAs mediate between stakeholders and 
enable bottom-up implementation of environmental sustainability policy. This makes them key actors 
in realizing Collin’s (1997) definition of subsidiarity as referring to the coordination between different 
levels of government, rather than simply directing power to lower levels.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
Across several disciplines scholars have stressed the added value of transnational municipal 
cooperation. In fact, the focus has primarily been on how Europe’s “bright stars” are exchanging best-
practise and are even actively lobbying the European institutions. Given the fact that Europe’s 
municipalities are far greater in number that the selected few, this thesis has attempted to question the 
tremendous attention such networks receive by bringing the focus back on the domestic context within 
two EU member states in which local governments operate in order to explain how local governments 
are served by their respective Local Government Associations. Based on the assumption that most 
local governments in the EU are simply “reacting to Europe” instead of trying to influence policy in 
their favour, the role of LGAs in two member states has been shown as being key for enabling local 
officials of municipalities, regardless of size, to engage in knowledge and best-practise exchange with 
their peers and to make use of advisory services, not only specifically on “EU matters”, but across the 
many issues of municipal competence with regard to environmental sustainability. Regardless of the 
federal or unitary nature of a member state’s political system LGA services appear to be well 
positioned within the domestic support framework for local environmental and climate change policy 
by acting as mediators between different levels of government.  
Acting as the main proponents of local self-governance and local flexibility to respond to higher-up 
developments, they should be considered as a valuable asset for local governments that do not have 
the capacity to engage in international best-practice exchange, but still find themselves subject to EU 
legislation with regard to environmental sustainability.  
 
Having established the importance of these organizations, it would be highly rewarding to expand this 
study with regard to two issues. While this thesis has focused on the facilitating role of LGAs, in 
Germany and The Netherlands, they do also jointly lobby the European institutions at the Council of 
Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), in addition to the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Analysing 
lobbying approaches within these fora would be valuable contribution as it would add to the literature 
on bottom-up Europeanization. Also, a quantitative study focusing on several smaller local 
governments and their interaction with LGAs vis-à-vis the EU would add further depth to this study. 
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